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Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019) 
 
  Layne Ryerson 
 
             After two trips to the United States Supreme Court, an Alaskan 
moose hunter secured motorized access to his hunting ground while 
establishing Alaska as the exception, rather than the rule, regarding federal 
land management. In a much-anticipated holding, the Court determined 
that the surface waters of the Nation River within the Yukon-Charley 
Rivers National Preserve qualify as “private” land and therefore fall 
beyond the control of the National Park Service. The decision stripped the 
Park Service of normal regulatory authority over navigable waters within 
Alaska’s national parks, prompting a concurrence urging Congress to 
clarify resulting ambiguities.   
  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 In Sturgeon v. Frost,1 the United States Supreme Court 
determined whether the National Park Service (“NPS”) could prohibit 
hovercraft use on the Nation River (“River”) within Alaska’s Yukon-
Charlie Rivers National Preserve (“Preserve”).2 Given the unique 
provisions of the Alaska National Interests Land Conservation Act 
(ANILCA), the Court found that the United States did not possess title to 
the River in the ordinary sense.3 Therefore, the waters of the River were 
not “publicly owned,” and exempt from the normal regulatory authority of 
the NPS.4 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In 2007, John Sturgeon was stopped by an NPS ranger while 
driving a hovercraft up the River to his moose hunting grounds within the 
Preserve.5 Hovercraft use was allowed under Alaska state law, but 
prohibited by the NPS, which managed the Preserve.6 Sturgeon complied 
with the ranger’s order to remove his hovercraft, but soon after sued the 
NPS, seeking an injunction allowing him to continue using his hovercraft 
to access his hunting grounds.7  
The United States District Court for the District of Alaska denied 
Sturgeon relief, holding that the NPS could enforce a nationwide ban on 
hovercrafts.8 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that NPS regulations apply 
 
1.     139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019). 
2.     Id. at 1071. 
3.     Id. (citing 43 U. S. C. § 1311 (2012)). 
4.     Id. 
5.     Id. at 1072. 
6.      Id.  
7.       Id .  
8.     Id. (citing Sturgeon v. Masica, No. 3:11–CV–0183, 2013 WL 
5888230, at *8 (D. Alaska Oct. 30, 2013)). 
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to all federal land and water, including all navigable waters lying within 
national parks.9 Sturgeon successfully petitioned for certiorari to the 
Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded on the grounds that the NPS 
could only regulate land and water deemed “public.”10 On remand, the 
Ninth Circuit determined that since the River ran through the federal 
Preserve, the NPS had authority to regulate the water and enforce its 
hovercraft ban.11 Sturgeon sought certiorari once more, arguing that such 
a ruling would grant federal control over all surface water within Alaskan 
national parks.12  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
The Court identified two primary issues for consideration: (1) 
whether the River qualified as public land under ANILCA,13 and (2) if the 
River did not qualify as public land, whether the NPS could nevertheless 
regulate Sturgeon’s activities.14 Additionally, the Court addressed the 
NPS’ plea for a special rule regarding Alaska’s navigable waters15  
 
A.  Public Land Under ANILCA 
 
Before addressing the status of the River, the Court provided a 
history lesson to illustrate Alaska’s unique land ownership scheme 
demonstrate why it often emerges as the exception, rather than the rule.16 
During statehood, the federal government recognized that Alaska’s size 
and natural resources required a balancing of federal and state regulation.17 
As a result, Congress passed ANILCA in 1980, designating over 104 
million acres as Conservation System Units (“CSUs”).18 The Preserve was 
one of ten national parks created by this process.19 When creating CSUs, 
Congress designated borders using “natural features” instead of drawing 
hard lines following federal ownership boundaries.20 However, Alaska’s 
combination of public, private, and native ownership made conformity 
impossible for many areas, including the Preserve.21 Ultimately, more than 
eighteen million acres of non-federal land were included in CSUs, giving 
rise to disputes such as Sturgeon’s.22  
 
9.     Id. (citing Sturgeon v. Masica, 768 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
10.     Id. (citing Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1072 (2016)). 
11.   Id. (citing Sturgeon v. Frost, 872 F.3d 927, 934 (9th Cir. 2017)). 
12.   Id. at 1078. 
13.    Id. at 1074.  
14. Id. at 1073. 
15.    Id.  
16. Id. 
17.     Id. at 1073–78. 
18.     Id. at 1075 
19.     Id. at 1069.  
20.     Id. at 1075. 
21.     Id.  
22.     Id at 1075–76. 
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After explaining the underlying history, the Court then addressed 
the NPS’ ownership claim to the River.23 Because the ANILCA defined 
“public land” as “all land, waters, and interests therein” belonging to the 
United States, if the NPS could establish the River as public land it could 
assert it regulatory power to enforce a hovercraft ban.24  
The NPS conceded that the Submerged Lands Act granted states 
title to land underlying navigable rivers, and instead based its claim on  a 
novel interpretation of the “reserved-water-rights-doctrine.”25 The NPS 
argued that since the Preserve’s purpose is to safeguard water from 
depletion and diversion, Congress intended to reserve an interest in 
navigable waters appurtenant to reserved land.26   
The Court quickly dismissed this argument, stating that reserved 
water rights are “usufructuary in nature,” meaning they are rights for the 
government to use rather than own.27 Moreover, even if the NPS had some 
form of title in the River under the doctrine, such title would merely allow 
the government to “take or maintain the specific ‘amount of water’—and 
‘no more’—required to ‘fulfill the purpose of [its land] reservation.’”28 
Therefore, the NPS could only protect water from “depletion or 
diversion.”29 Because hovercrafts do not “deplete or divert the waterway,” 
much less touch the surface at all, the Court found a hovercraft ban could 
not be justified through title under the reserved-water-rights-doctrine.30 
Additionally, because the NPS did not own title to the River, the Court 
determined it did not qualify as “public land” under ANILCA.31 
 
B.  NPS Regulation of Non-Public Waterways 
 
The Court then addressed whether the NPS could nevertheless 
regulate non-public lands within Alaska’s CSUs.32 Crucial to the question, 
the Court noted, was ANILCA § 103(c), which only allowed the NPS to 
regulate areas within the CSUs deemed “parkland.”33   
The Court explained that § 103(c) “grew out of ANILCA’s 
unusual method for drawing park boundaries” based on “natural 
features.”34 Section 103(c) was therefore drafted to limit regulations on the 
 
23.      Id. at 1074.  
24.      Id. 
25.     Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012)). “[W]hen the Federal 
Government withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal 
purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then 
unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.” 
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976). 
26.    Id. (citing Winters v. United States, 207 U. S. 564, 576 (1908)).  
27.  Id. 
28.  Id. (quoting Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141). 
29.       Id. (quoting Br. Resp’t’s 35).  
30.       Id. at 1080. (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 30258 (1983)).  
31. Id. 
32. Id.  
33.       Id.; see 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c) (2012). 
34. Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1074 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 3103(b) (2012)). 
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“state, native organizations, and private individuals” whose property fell 
within these all-encompassing borders.35 
To determine the scope of these protections, the Court broke down 
§ 103(c) sentence by sentence.36 The first sentence stated that only “public 
lands” within the CSUs “shall be deemed” part of the units.37 Placing 
emphasis on the word “deemed,” the Court interpreted this to imply that 
“all non-public lands (again, including waters) would be ‘deemed,’ 
abracadabra-style, outside Alaska’s [CSUs].”38 The second sentence, 
meanwhile, provided that state, native, and private lands within the CSUs 
were not subject to “regulations applicable solely to public lands.”39 
Finally, the Court noted that the third sentence established an “escape 
hatch,” providing that non-public lands located in CSUs may be regulated 
by the NPS if the non-federal owner transferred their interest to the 
government.40 As a whole, the Court that under § 103(c) non-public lands 
within the CSUs were free from NPS regulation, unless the non-public 
landholder conveyed the property to the NPS.41  
The NPS argued for a different interpretation, however, relying 
primarily on the word “solely” in the second sentence.42 Accordingly to 
the NPS, if regulations applied to both public and non-public lands, it was 
free to regulate both.43 The NPS pointed to public policy, stating that 
requiring park-wide regulations to adjust in accordance with intertwined 
“non-public” land would limit effective management of the Preserve.44  
The Court found that this logic ran counter to the intent of ANILCA, and 
that such an interpretation would nullify the first and third sentences of § 
103(c).45 The Court stated that ANILCA was a “grand bargain” intended 
to balance “natural, scenic, and historical values” with Alaska’s 
“economic and social needs.”46 While NPS regulation of navigable water 
would facilitate natural and scenic preservation, it could harm economic 
and social needs of many Alaskans.47 The Court also observed that the 
legislative sponsors of § 103(c) understood that CSUs would not “change 
the status” of the state, Native, or private land located inside.48 
Additionally, the NPS’ interpretation of § 103(c) would destroy the 
distinction between private and public land contemplated by the section’s 
first sentence.49 Moreover, the third sentence would become useless since 
 
35. Id.  
36.  Id. at 1070 (citing 16 U. S. C. § 3103(c)). 
37  Id.  
38. Id.  
39.  Id. at 1083 (citing 16 U. S. C. § 3103(c)). 
40.  Id.  
41.     Id. 
42.     Id.  
43. Id.  
44. Id.  
45.     Id.  
46.     Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 3101(a)). 
47.     Id. at 1084. 
48.  Id. (quoting 125 Cong. Rec. 11158 (1979)).  
49. Id.  
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there would be no need for the NPS to purchase the non-public inholdings 
if it was already free to regulate.50 The Court reasoned that the word 
“solely” was not intended to create on exception for rules applicable to 
both public and non-public lands, but to clarify which regulations apply to 
“private” land within the CSUs.51 Without the word, the statute could be 
read to exempt the land from a “raft” of additional regulations.52 Instead, 
by using the adverb, Congress intended to show that the exemption was 
exclusive to regulations established by the NPS.53 Accordingly, the Court 
held that the language of § 103(c) weighed in favor of Sturgeon and 
exempted non-public property from NPS regulation.54 
 
C.  Special Authority Over Alaska’s Navigable Waters 
 
Finally, the Court addressed the NPS’ additional argument that 
ANILCA’s “statutory scheme” “must at least allow it to regulate navigable 
waters.”55 The NPS pointed to several supporting factors, including 
ANILCA’s stated purpose to “protect and preserve rivers,” and other 
statutes allowing the NPS to regulate boating and fishing on select rivers.56 
The Court disagreed, stating that the ANILCA did not allow the 
“decoupling” of waterways from areas deemed “private.”57 Furthermore, 
the Court noted that under ANILCA  “lands” referred to “land, water, and 
interest therein,” thereby not excluding navigable water from the spectrum 
of private ownership in the CSUs.58 Additionally, the Court stated that its 
ruling did not strip the NPS of all ability to “protect” navigable waters 
within Alaska’s national parks. The NPS remained free to regulate “public 
lands flanking rivers,” enter into “cooperative agreements” with the state 
or other landowners, offer proposals for management, and even purchase 
desired land pursuant to the third sentence of § 103(c).59 
Before concluding, the Court discussed the public policy at play 
in its uniquely Alaskan decision.60 While Sturgeon may have been able to 
find an alternative hunting ground, many of Alaska’s rural residents rely 
on navigable waters for transportation.61 With over three-quarters of 
Alaskan communities in areas unconnected to a road system, rivers 
become critically necessary for access to food, fuel, and health care.62 The 
 
50. Id. 
51.     Id.  
52.     Id. 
53.     Id.  
54. Id. at 1085. 
55.     Id.  
56.  Id. at 1085–86 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 3121, 3170, 3201, 3203(b), 
3204 (2012)). 
57.     Id. at 1086 (quoting Br. Resp’t’s 40). 
58.     Id. (citing A. SCALIA & B. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 228 (2012)). 
59.   Id. at 1086–87 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 3191(b)(7)). 
60.  Id. at 1087. 
61. Id.  
62.  Id. 
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Court determined that Alaska needs local control over its rivers to preserve 
the lifestyle of its rural citizens, and therefore must remain the exception 
to federal land regulation.63 
 
IV.  CONCURRENCE 
 
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, issued a 
concurrence suggesting Congress resolve uncertainties left by the Court 
regarding the NPS’ remaining authority over navigable waters in Alaska 
parks.64 The concurring Justices agreed with the Court’s reading of 
ANILCA Section 103(c), but noted that the holding merely determined the 
River could not be regulated as part of the National Park System, not that 
the NPS was prohibited from regulating it at all.65 
The Justices noted that it would be “absurd” for Congress to 
expect the NPS to “preserve” Alaska’s rivers without giving it power to 
accomplish that end.66 If § 103(c) stripped the NPS of all control over non-
public navigable waters, it would be incapable of enforcing a variety of 
banned actions, including polluting and disturbing wildlife.67 Such actions 
on the River would impact surrounding public land and limit the NPS’ 
mission to maintain “environmental integrity and preserve undeveloped 
natural condition.”68   
 While the NPS may not assert ordinary regulatory authority over 
the River, the Justices stressed that under its Organic Act, the agency could 
still regulate non-public land within the Preserve when necessary to 
protect adjoining public land.69 This power would extend to activities “on 
or relating to water located within [Park] System units.”70 Further, the 
concurrence stated that the power of the Organic Act is unfettered by 
ANILCA.71 While the Organic Act likely would not justify rules against 
trespass, it may permit regulations on non-public property when necessary 
to protect surrounding parkland.72 The Justices noted that this would likely 
including banning hovercrafts in certain sensitive areas.73 
Additionally, the concurrence identified the Wild and Scenic 
Rivers Act (“WSRA”) as an additional avenue for the NPS to regulate non-
public navigable waterways in Alaska.74 ANILCA designated twenty six 
Alaskan rivers under the WSRA and clarified that the NPS retained 
 
63.  Id.  
64       Id. at 1088 (Sotomayor, J., with Ginsberg, J., concurring).  
65.   Id.  
66. Id. at 1090. 
67.  Id.  
68.  Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 410hh(10) (2012)). 
69.  Id. (citing 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a)).  
70.  Id. (quoting 54 U. S. C. § 100751(a)).     
71.  Id. at 1092. 
72.  Id. (citing 36 CFR §§ 2.22(a), §2.31(a)(1) (2019)). 
73.   Id. (citing General Regulations for Areas Administered by the 
National Park Service, 48 Fed. Reg. 30258 (June 30, 1983)).  
74.  Id. at 1093; see 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (2012).  
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authority over all navigable water under this designation.75 Although § 
103(c) was intended to generally remove navigable waterways from NPS 
control, the specific language in WSRA would likely control.76 
Accordingly, the concurrence recommended Congress resolve these 
ambiguities and “clarify the broad scope of the [NPS’] authority over 
Alaska’s navigable waters.”77 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Court’s holding in Sturgeon v. Frost represented an 
appreciation of Alaska’s autonomy over its vast lands and waters. By 
clarifying that the NPS does not have normal regulatory authority over the 
River, the Court allowed Alaska to retain control and effectively 
implement ANILCA. Although the decision limited NPS authority in 
Alaska, future legislation from Congress may clarify the regulatory power 
of the NPS under the Organic Act, or the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.  But 
as of now, Alaska remains a notable exception to the rule.   
   
 
75.  Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1090. 
76.      Id. (citing D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U. S. 204, 208 
(1932)). 
77.      Id. at 1093–94. 
